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STEPHEN P. MUMME*
Minute 242 and Beyond: Challenges
and Opportunities for Managing
Transboundary Groundwater on the
Mexico-U. S. Border
ABSTRACT
Sharing transboundary groundwater remains one of the most
pressing and difficult issues in Mexico-U.S. relations despite
Minute 242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission,
signed in 1973, which acknowledges the need to develop a
comprehensive groundwater agreement for the border region. This
essay profiles the numerous groundwater disputes along the border
and analyzes current institutional and political opportunities for
resolving them. Common pool resources theory and recent work in
prescriptive international aw are utilized to identify opportunities
for greater binational cooperation. Given the history and
complexity of the transboundary water dispute, this paper
concludes with four recommendations:first, that the two countries
continue to strengthen and share technical knowledge; second, that
they strive for incremental solutions; third, that they prioritize
settling their most tractable disagreements; and finally, that they
support international efforts to further develop prescriptive
international legal principles as articulated in the recent
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of
International Watercourses and the Bellagio Draft Treaty on
transboundary groundwater.
INTRODUCTION
On the list of enduring controversies in Mexico-U.S. relations, few
disputes have proven as intractable as the allocation and management of
transboundary groundwater. Over a quarter century has passed since the
two countries signed the landmark agreement, Minute 242, which
expresses their joint commitment towards resolving this issue.1 Today the
* Stephen P. Mumme (Ph.D. Arizona 1982) is Professor of Political Science at Colorado
State University, Fort Collins, Colorado. He may be contacted by phone (970-491-7428) and
email (smumme@lamar.colostate.edu).
1. See Int'l Boundary & Water Comm'n, Minute No. 242: Permanent and Definitive
Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River, 15 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 2, 2-9 (1975) [hereinafter Minute 242).
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goal of Minute 242 remains unfulfilled. Despite a train of intermittent
discussions and localized problems, little progress has been made since
1973. The inevitable result is the current unsustainable yet escalating race
amongst parties on both sides of the border to drain these vital resources.
This state of affairs defies the sustainable management of these joint
resources, serves as a source of real friction in Mexico-U.S. relations, and
deserves the concerted attention of those gathered here today.
Before proceeding any further I wish to pay homage to an
individual who, more than any other, dedicated his genius and will to the
resolution of this dispute, the late professor Albert E. Utton. Over a career
of 30 years, Al Utton strove to harness the best thinking in international
and domestic law to solve the transboundary groundwater dispute. With
a dignity and grace that few can match he prodded government, academe,
and the private sector to address this issue with the persuasive belief that
it could be solved amicably, cooperatively, and bilaterally. When and if the
letter and spirit of Minute 242 is eventually realized it will be in no small
measure the result of Utton's vision and enduring faith in the triumph of
cooperative solutions to transboundary disputes over natural resources.
From his vantage point as editor of the Natural Resources Journal,
Al Utton understood that Minute 242 was one of those important moments
when two nations accomplish more than they intended3 Minute 242 and
its groundwater provisions are ambitious. Not only does it commit Mexico
and the United States to developing a "comprehensive" transboundary
solution to the extant and emerging groundwater disputes along the
border, it provides for the development of a cooperative management
solution to the divisive Colorado River salinity dispute, and contains a site-
specific, practical, and cooperative solution to the groundwater war then
in progress at San Luis.3 Additionally, Minute 242 arguably brought
groundwater within the orbit of the 1944 Water Treaty,' which provides a
principled basis for dialogue and joint action on the somewhat taboo issue
of equitable apportionment.
Certainly, numerous obstacles to effective dispute resolution and
cooperative management of transboundary groundwater remain. Most of
these barriers are based on the economics and politics of scarce resources.
2. See Albert E. Utton, Mexican International Waters, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
126, 126-27 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
3. For a discussion of the San Luis groundwater war see Michael D. Bradley &
Kenneth J. DeCook, Groundwater Occurrence and Utilization in the Arizona-Sonora Border
Region, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29,36-38 (1978).
4. See Albert E. Utton, The Transfer of Waterfrom an International Border Region: A Tale
of Six Cities and the All-American Canal, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 477,489-90 (1991);
C.R. Bath, Transboundary Resource Management Models: Applicability to the El Paso-Ciudad
JudrezRegionforGroundwaterManagement, 10TRANSBOUNDARYRESOURCESREP. 1,1-3 (1996).
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Along the border, demographic and economic pressures on water
resources have steadily mounted in the past quarter-century. Within both
countries, accelerated rural to urban transfer has led to rising urban water
demand and the inevitable press for more efficient water uses. This greater
demand has raised market water value and caused rural and agricultural
interests to become ever more protective of their water rights and stocks.
Contiguous border-adjacent cities, such as El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad
Ju~rez, Chihuahua, have scrambled to augment and secure their water
supplies. Along with these pressures, differing political jurisdictions and
variations in sub-national water management regimes complicate the
search for bilateral consensus on groundwater management.
On the other hand, not all of the multiple forces and interests in the
border region are inimical to the deepening of binational cooperation in
managing scarce groundwater resources. In fact, the past quarter century
has seen great institutional development and a stated, if still unrealized,
commitment to achieving sustainable development in the border area. The
emergence of new institutions and the evolution of old ones has fostered
a greater awareness of Mexico-U.S. interdependence and has shed light on
the necessity of broadening and strengthening cooperative approaches to
managing transboundary groundwater. At the international level, progress
is being made towards a universal understanding of the legal requisites
necessary for managing international drainage basins and a consensus is
evolving on the appropriate norms and customary laws that ought to apply
in allocating and administering these resources. The Bellagio Draft Treaty
on International Groundwater Management, authored by professors Robert
Hayton and Albert E. Utton, is a fine example of this advancement.'
Additionally, though still inadequate, the quality of geophysical
information on groundwater presence and availability is better than ever
before. Since 1973, numerous studies and reports detailing the availability
of groundwater stocks have been generated, and this information is being
used to create an integrated picture of groundwater location, availability,
and quality. Moreover, since 1973, the public has grown increasingly
appreciative of the importance of groundwater in the border region, its
economic value, its place in the hydrologic cycle, and the need for
managing those resources in a sustainable way.
In sum, while it is possible to view the obstacles as greater than
ever, the past quarter century has brought progress in other areas germane
to the strengthening of bilateral cooperation in husbanding transboundary
groundwater. Understanding the possibilities for moving the two countries
ahead on this issue is an essential precondition for breaking through the
5. RoBERT HAYTON & ALBERT E. UTTON, TRANSDouNDARY GROUNDWATERS: THE
BELLAGIO DRAFT TREATY (1989).
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current diplomatic impasse. This paper provides an overview of these
possibilities. In order to gain a better understanding of the current
situation, section I profiles the various transboundary groundwater basins
on the border and catalogs location, utilization, and management practices.
These basins, and their attendant characteristics of use, will need to be
carefully considered in any effort to advance binational management of
transboundary groundwater. Section II turns to an examination of the
institutional and political opportunities for discussing and developing this
management plan. Specifically, general theory on international cooperation
in transboundary resource disputes and recent developments in
international law are applied to the practical realities of the current
situation to identify potential opportunities for further cooperation. Section
III examines the institutional developments that may help facilitate a
resolution. Finally, section IV consists of observations and suggestions for
further progress on this pressing and complex issue.
I. CURRENT AND POTENTIAL GROUNDWATER DISPUTES ON
THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER: AN OVERVIEW
The complexity of the transboundary groundwater dispute is
particularly evident when considered on a border-wide basis. The general
literature on groundwater conditions along the Mexico-U.S. border
supports the proposition that there are at least 18 different problem areas
scattered across eight geographic zones.'Considering the distinctive nature
of the disputes currently in play along the border, the divisiveness of the
interests involved, and the lack of awareness of additional problem areas,
this is arguably a conservative estimate. It is necessary to consider this
wide range of problems because they both influence, and will be influenced
by, any attempt to create a more cooperative approach towards managing
transboundary groundwater.
This broad range of current problems and potential controversies
is listed below in table form. Table 1 orders these problem areas according
to location, from west to east, and contains a list of their salient
characteristics. Table 2 classifies these problem areas according to their
dominant issue-type (allocation or water quality) and their demographic
setting (rural or urban).
This inventory of transboundary groundwater basins reveals that
there is an elaborate combination of actual and potential conflict situations
6. SeegenerallyStephenP.Mumme,GroundwaterManagementon the Mexico-United
States Border (Dec. 1996) (unpublished report submitted to the Commission on
Environmental Cooperation, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, as part of the Mexico-United
States-Canada Transboundary Inland Water Project, on file with author).
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along the border. A majority of these disputes are located along the land
boundary, while a lesser number are located along the Rio Grande
limitrophe, (and even fewer if we exclude problems in the Hueco and
Mesilla Bolsons). Several upstream-downstream situations also exist, with
Mexico often in the downstream position along the land boundary. Yet
Mexico is best described as the upstream partner in a number of basin sites.
Also, a majority of basins are demographically complex, in that they host
both urban demographic water demands and those more traditionally
associated with rural areas. Further, as we look at patterns of utilization
and associated problems, the majority of these are not simply matters of
quantity but also quality and security of the water supply.
Tables 1 and 2 also reveal certain deficiencies in the current
management situation, including the fact that the data on groundwater
presence and utilization is still incomplete. In large areas of the border
region very little is known about the stock and flow of groundwater
resources. Additionally, these tables support the conclusion that
groundwater management practices are poorly institutionalized and
generally deficient for purposes of achieving a sustainable yield of the
resource. Most groundwater withdrawals are unregulated and, with a few
notable exceptions, are not undertaken pursuant to a regime of conjunctive
management of surface and subterranean resources. Additionally, it
appears as if the quantity and quality of groundwater stocks are better
monitored and conjunctive management approaches are more likely to be
found in urban areas, where the presence of large concentrated populations
has compelled the two governments to pay more attention to the limited
availability of water. In the aggregate, this complex situation, including the
lack of complete data and the inadequate management practices, makes a
compelling case for greater binational cooperation in managing this
resource.
II. INSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR COOPERATION IN
MANAGING TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER ON THE
MEXICO-U.S. BORDER. THEORY AND PRACTICE
To assess the prospects for moving ahead in transboundary
groundwater management, it is useful to consider this problem in the
context of applicable institutional theory. Today a significant body of
literature is dedicated to analyzing potential institutional bases for
cooperative or joint management of commonresources and related dispute
resolution. One strand of this discussion, founded on international river
disputes, identifies a variety of incentives for cooperation in managing
shared river basins or common water bodies. According to LeMarquand,
the potential for cooperation is greatest where the resource can be
converted to a sustainable public good, where the resource takes the form
Spring 20001
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of a common pool, where there are integrated development possibilities,
and where no party enjoys asymmetrical control over the resource in
question! While transboundary groundwater disputes are not, in the
strictest sense, hydrologically analogous to international river disputes,
sufficient similarities warrant a comparison.
Analyzed within this framework, the potential for developing a
cooperative transboundary groundwater management scheme is neither
great nor poor. First, since groundwater is appropriated through a system
of private property rights on both sides of the border, it is doubtful that it
could easily be converted into a pure public good. This system enables
rights-holders to deny others access to the resource and creates a potential
conflict between rights-holders and claimants to those same rights. In this
sense, groundwater is treated as a divisible resource, the antithesis of a
pure public good. Never the less, transboundary groundwater is a classic
common pool resource at both domestic and international levels."
Additionally, at various locations along the border, the possibility for
integrated development exists. Unfortunately, however, control is
asymmetrically centered in the United States, adding to the burden of
difficulty in achieving any solution to this binational problem.
Pursuing this line of inquiry further, the rich literature on
managing common pool resources identifies a number of other conditions
that are generally propitious for cooperative management. Elinor Ostrom
and her colleagues at the University of Indiana have identified four basic
characteristics that help facilitate cooperative management solutions for
common pool resource disputes: first, that the resource is not depleted
beyond recovery; second, that resource conditions can be reliably
determined; third, that the resource is sufficiently predictable; and fourth,
that resource distribution is localized such that it can be evaluated and
regulated.9 These characteristics can be seen to a certain degree within the
Mexico-U.S. transboundary groundwater dispute. However, the varying
and numerous appropriation rules at the national and sub-national level,
which are premised on notions of divisiblity and subtractability, complicate
the adoption of cooperative management solutions. Additionally,
asymmetrical control over groundwater resources on the binational level
creates a strong disincentive against cooperation.
7. See DAVID G. LEMARQUAND, INTERNATIONALRIvERs: THE POLTcsoF COOPERATION
7-11 (1977).
8. A common pool dilemma exists where two or more parties share a valuable
common resource in the absence of clearly specified rules or regulations concerning its use,
thereby enhancing each party's incentives to appropriate the resource to the point of
degradation or exhaustion, eventually reducing its utility to all interested parties.
9. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 31-40 (1990); J. Burger & M.
Gochfeld, The Tragedy of the Commons 30 Years Later, 40 ENV'T 8 (1998).
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The first predicament represents the classic problem associated
with common pool resources, in that the resource is divided by two
different national resource regimes. Ostrom calls these "constitutional"
regimes that define property rights and access to the resource.0 These
regimes, being only loosely defined on both sides of the border, contribute
to user uncertainty and, in turn, strengthen the incentives to deplete the
resource. This problem of constitutional uncertainty is amplified by the
asymmetry of control, where one nationally situated community of users
is positioned to deny another access to resource benefits. In this situation,
in the absence of adequate constitutional authority applicable to the
commons, uncertainty exists on a variety of levels (1) as to whether the
resource does, indeed, constitute a commons; (2) as to the stock and flow
of the common resource; (3) as to the possible joint benefits of treating and
managing the resource as a commons; and (4) as to the nature of the
principles or rules that ought to govern such a hypothetical commons. In
this case, common pool theorists argue that it is rational for the superior
party to continue to regard the resource as its own and use it according to
such conventional practices as exist in that national and sub-national
constitutional setting."
What factors, if any, might be conducive to extricating disputing
parties from this predicament and persuading them to move towards a
cooperative solution? The literature on common pool resource
management suggests utilizing the following variables as incentives to
promote greater cooperation: increasing the quality and accessibility of
information for the community of users; publicizing the mutual benefits
and/or mutual harms arising from current, or status-quo rules and
practices by comparison to proposed rules and practices; developing a
common frame of reference for the design of rules and regulations at the
constitutional and collective action levels; and embracing the opportunity
for incremental change."
The dissemination of accurate knowledge concerning the character,
diffusion, availability, and value of the resource is critical to developing an
understanding of the need to redefine the rules of allocation and
management, and to reaching an agreement on the values at stake on the
individual and institutional levels. The perception of mutual benefits that
improve the status quo and/or prevent mutual harms constitute essential
incentives to the search for alternative and preferable rules and regulations.
The convergence of different users around common frames of reference
helps to establish mutual trust and direct the parties toward mutually
10. See OSTROM, supra note 9, at 43-52.
11. See LEMARQUAND, supra note 7, at 10-11.
12. See OSTROM, supra note 9, at 139-42,210-14.
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acceptable rules and regulations to manage the resource. The likelihood
that competing parties will unite around a common set of understandings
and adopt mutually acceptable rules is, in turn, affected by the magnitude
of the differences amongst the competing parties. If the changes to be made
are profound, rather than incremental, the stakes are higher, and this
makes reaching an agreement more difficult.
To what extent are these conditions present along the border?
Spurred by NAFTA based binational initiatives such as Border XXI,' the
two countries are collaborating on the development of shared groundwater
databases in a number of basins. Other binational initiatives, such as the
Texas-based Transboundary Resources Inventory Project (TRIP), 4 and the
joint project by the U.S. Department of Interior and Mexico's environmental
ministry (SEMARNAP) to develop Geographic Information Systems
(GIS),5 have contributed to extant knowledge about the hydrological eco-
region and cross-basin aspects of the border region. 6 As this common
database is critical to understanding the possibilities for sustainable
development along the border, further progress in these areas is essential
in order to have a sufficient knowledge and technical basis for binational
discussion and negotiation of transboundary groundwater disputes.
Accurately characterizing the perception of mutual benefits and
harms associated with current groundwater management along the border
is risky indeed, and well beyond the scope of this essay. What can be said
with relative confidence is that the current situation is shaped by national
asymmetry regarding the extraction and control over these resources. It
may also be safely said that there is a considerable dissatisfaction amongst
non-traditional stakeholders-such as environmental organizations,
governmental natural resources managers, and the interested
public-concerning the adequacy of current practices in meeting the goals
associated with sustainable development. 7 Furthermore, binational
13. See ENVTL PROTECION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA 160-R-96-003, U.S.-MExICo BORDER
XXI PROGRAM FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT (1996).
14. This project was recently transferred from the Texas General Land Office to the
Texas Natural Resource Information System: Borderland Information Center (512) 463-
8337.
15. See ENVTL PROTEcrIONAGENCY, PuB. No. EPA, 160-R-98-001, U.S.-MEXIco BORDER
XXI PROGRAM, 1997-1998 IMPLEMENTATION PLANS AND 1996 ACCOMPULSHMENTS REPORT
(1997) [hereinafter BORDER XXI PROGRAM 1997-1998 IMPLEMENTATION PLANS].
16. For a list of such projects see ENVTL. PROTECTON AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA 160-R-98-
003, U.S.-MExico BORDER XXI 1998 IMPLEMENTATION PLANS (1998).
17. For a comprehensive look at public views on environmental protection on the
border see ENVTL PROTECrION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA 160-R-96-001, U.S.-MxICO BORDER
XXI PROGRAM, SUMMARY OF DOMESTIC MEEnNGS (1996). For a focused look at a coalition
of environmentalists' views on U.S.-Mexican water management along the Rio Grande
River, see the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo Basin Coalition website at <http:/www.rioweb.org>.
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discussion of these issues has been largely confined to the work of the
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). This may indicate
a very low level of trust associated with the high stakes of border
groundwater allocation. Thus, viewed with a wide lens, it is fair to
characterize the current situation as one where significant stakeholders on
both sides of the border, though not all, perceive significant harm in the
perpetuation of present practices.
Further complicating the resolution of the current groundwater
situation is the absence of a common frame of reference for the design of
management rules concerning the appropriation and use of the resource.
The existence of two national groundwater management regimes, Mexico's
being centralized and directed by federal authorities, and the United States'
regime being decentralized and managed under varying state control may
significantly impede the achievement of any real comprehensive solution
to border groundwater management. It is not as serious an obstacle to the
achievement of basin-by-basin, or case-by-case negotiations, since these
approaches allow a greater degree of flexibility in tailoring solutions to the
varying forms of institutional practices now in place. However, in the
absence of significant binational progress since Minute 242 was adopted,
the border-wide groundwater situation may be generally characterized as
a high stakes problem, requiring immediate non-incremental changes to
current practices. Viewed from a border-wide perspective, then, the
institutional barriers to resolving current groundwater disputes are high,
despite apparent progress in the development of databases and data-
sharing across the border.
A worst case scenario in light of these criteria is found in the
dispute over the All-American Canal (AAC). 5 Here, a decision by the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation to line the AAC with concrete to prevent seepage
has provoked an open dispute over transboundary groundwater along the
border. The Bureau's decision has the support of most water rights holders
in the Imperial Valley and Southern California region including key
institutional players such as the Imperial Irrigation District, Coachella
Irrigation District, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, and
the San Diego County Water Authority. These agencies downplay the
measure as merely a practical water conservation practice when, in fact, it
will substantially augment regional supply in one of the most competitive
18. The literature on the All-American Canal dispute is fairly extensive. In addition
to press reports, interested readers should consult the following sources: Douglas L. Hayes,
The All-American Canal Lining Project: A Catalyst for Rational and Comprehensive Groundwater
Management on the United States.-Mexico Border, 31 NAT. RssouRcEsJ. 803 (1991); Utton, supra
note 4; T. Waller, Southern California Water Politics and U.S.-Mexican Relations: Lining theAll-
American Canal, 7 J. BORDERLANDS STUD. 1 (1992); U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT. ALL-AMERICAN CANAL LINING REPORT (1991).
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water demand situations in the country. 9 The binational controversy arises
because the AAC, which runs very close and parallel to the international
boundary, is a major source of groundwater recharge to the Mexicali
Valley Consequently, the lining project will undoubtedly diminish
inflows to the Mexican side, reducing the net stock of groundwater
available for irrigated agriculture and other uses. Due to this, Mexico has
informally charged that the United States is unilaterally retaining
groundwater supplies in violation of international law and practice. The
United States, in turn, argues that under the terms of the 1944 Water Treaty
it is entitled to the water saved by lining the canal."
According to common pool resource theory, the AAC represents
a classic impasse with little prospect of solution on its own terms. First, the
quality of information available to the binational set of affected users is
highly unequal. While the two countries have followed the terms of Minute
242 in informing each other of pending developments on their respective
sides of the border, they are both reluctant to share basic hydrographic
information or consider the impact of development in basin-wide
environmental terms.' Second, the two nations differ in both their social
construction of the AAC lining and in their costs/benefits analysis of this
project. U.S. interests define the project as a purely internal one, involving
the just distribution of national surface waters.' In contrast, Mexico views
the project as an unjust taking of groundwater from a transboundary
aquifer that it has substantially relied on for decades.' Additionally, there
are several impediments to developing a common frame of reference that
would enable both nations to adopt common rules for allocation and
management of transboundary groundwater on both the national (federal
and state) and international level. At present, groundwater management
19. See generally U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAcT
REPORT: ALL-AMERICAN CANAL LINING REPORT (1991); ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB.
No. EPA 160-R-96-001, U.S./MEXIco BORDER XXI PROGRAM, SUMMARY OF DoMESTIC
MEETINGS (1996).
20. See id.
21. See Hayes, supra note 18, at 2-3; Waller, supra note 18, at 18-19. The best
presentation of the legal arguments that could be advanced by Mexico and the United
States in this case is found in Utton, supra note 4, at 477-95.
22. See generally L. Jones et aL, Assessing Transboundary Environmental Impacts on the
U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Canadian Borders, 12 J. BORDERLANDS STUD. 73 (1997).
23. See Utton, supra note 4, at 479.
24. The concern for water quality is minimal and has thus far not entered into the
framing of the issue though important water quality issues related to groundwater are
found within the basin.
[Vol. 40
MINUTE 242 AND BEYOND
practices in northern Mexico and California vary considerably.' Apart
from a distant similarity in favoring prior appropriation and the general
provisions of Minute 242, which requires prior notification in the case of
pending national development of groundwater along the border, there is
little common ground upon which to frame a cooperative approach to
managing this resource. However, the evolving work of the international
legal community and the deepening of U.S. and Mexican joint
commitments to certain regional and international environmental practices
may constitute a ray of hope.' Finally, both the unilateral nature of the U.S.
action to withdraw the resource by lining the AAC and the magnitude of
this withdrawal constitute a significant, not an incremental, alteration in
the status quo that aggravates tensions and complicates the search for a
joint solution.
In contrast, a very different set of circumstances confronts water
managers and publics in the Hueco Bolson straddling the Texas-Chihuahua
border. Here, virtually all water pumped from the aquifer is used to
support the urban domestic and industrial demand of the contiguous cities
of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juirez, Chihuahua, or as locals call it,
EPJAZY One of the defining features of this basin is that a great many
people exclusively depend on this resource and demand is rising rapidly
on both sides of the border. Another defining feature of this basin is that a
great deal is known about it- most importantly, that it is finite, and that at
current and projected rates it will be depleted in about 30 years.
Additionally, the mingling of sweet and saline water as well as domestic
and industrial contamination overlying the basin have lowered the
groundwater quality.
25. Mexican national water law provides for private ownership and utilization of
groundwater subject to the presumption that groundwater is a national resource that may
be regulated in the national interest to include provision for the establishment of protected
areas, while groundwater regulation is a matter of state law in the United States. California
water law treats groundwater as private property and applies the doctrine of "correlative
rights" to groundwater appropriations. See COMISION NACIONALDELAGUA, LEY DEAGUAs
NACIONALES (1992) [hereinafter Ls DE AGUAS NACIONALES]; R. Wehmhoefer, Water Law
in the Southwest, WATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHWEST 29-30 (Z. Smith ed., 1989).
26. See International Law Association, Resolution on International Groundwaters, in THE
WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw ASSOCIATION ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATER
RESOURCES 39,39-41 (Int'l Transboundary Resources Ctr. ed., 1996).
27. See LYNDONB.JOHNSONSCHOOLOFPUBLICAFFAIRS, WATERANDDEVELOPMENT THE
Rio GRANDE/ Rio BRAVO (Jurgen Schmandt ed., 1992/93).
28. See id. See also TEX. WATER DEv. BD., WATER FOR TEXAS: TODAY AND ToMoRRow
(1990); TEx. WATER COMM'N, REGIONAL AsSESSMENT OF WATER QUALITY IN THE Rio
GRANDE/RIOBAVO55 (1992); Int'l Boundary &Water Comm'n, TransbundaryAquifersand
Binational Groundwater Database City of El Paso/Ciudad Judrez Area (last modified Aug. 8,
1999) <http://www.ibwc.state.gov/RIOGRAND/tranaqui.htm> [hereinafter
Transboundary Aquifers Database]; Mauricio G. Mercado & Ma. Del Rosario Diaz A.,
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In terms of the elements necessary for cooperative institution
building, the Hueco Bolson problem appears more tractable than the AAC
lining dispute. First, the quality and accessibility of information to users is
the best on the border. The two countries have shared nationally gathered
information on this basin for nearly a decade and are currently co-
developing computer groundwater flow models of the Hueco Bolson
aquifer.2 Detailed information concerning current uses, demand-
consumption rates, and other socio-economic data are also shared
binationally. Watermanagers at the municipal levels inboth countries have
developed working relationships with each other and are generally
comfortable discussing municipal water issues and sharing information.
Additionally, the IBWC's national sections are in the process of developing
a formal binational groundwater-monitoring network to exchange
information." Thus, there is growing trust based on cooperative
information sharing practices on which the two countries rely.
Second, the private and public sectors on both sides of the border
are beginning to fully recognize the costs and benefits in similar terms. The
potential harm of sustaining current binational water use is mutual.
Likewise, there is a growing binational appreciation of the benefits to be
gleaned from cooperatively developing a more sustainable approach to
transboundary water management. Important here is the absence of a clear
asymmetry of resource control. While both countries have access to the
resource, neither can effectively deny the other access. Moreover, both
sides recognize that the current race to deplete the resource harms
everyone's interest in sustaining a reliable source of urban water beyond
the near future. This growing understanding has manifested in national
efforts to conserve water resources in the basin, which, even if not truly
cooperative, are at least based on a common sense approach towards the
reality of resource depletion.
Third, despite the fact that groundwater resource regimes vary
considerably from nation to nation along the border today, there is a
comparatively greater common frame of reference due, in large part, to the
growing public recognition of the common pool aspects of local water
resources. In 1993, EPJAZ became the first binational conurbation on the
border to enter into a joint cooperative arrangement for managing the
transboundary air shed.1 While different from the groundwater situation,
Problematica del Recurso Agua y Accion para su Conservacion y Mejoramiento en Ciudad
Judrez, Chihuahua (unpublished manuscript presented at Association of Borderlands
Studies, Annual Meeting in Reno, Nevada, Apr. 22,1996, on file with author).
29. See Transboundary Aquifers Database, supra note 28; BORDER XXI PROGRAM
1997-1998 IMPLEMENTATION PLANS, supra note 15.
30. See Transboundary Aquifers Database, supra note 28, at 16.
31. See BORDER XXI PROGRAM 1997-1998 IMPLEMENTATION PLANS, supra note 15, at 30.
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this arrangement provides municipal leaders invaluable experience in local
binational resource management and improves the climate for considering
similar ventures. Finally, these cooperative efforts are proceeding
incrementally, and, as such, they provide needed experience and nurture
mutual trust in cooperative management approaches.
This discussion of two transboundary groundwater problems
within a common pool resources management framework demonstrates
that the Hueco Bolson is a more suitable candidate for a cooperative
management solution than the AAC. While this theoretically informed
comparison fails to capture all the variables in play, it does suggest that
moving beyond Minute 242 will depend on discerning and prioritizing the
basin disputes that are comparatively more resolvable.
Additionally, this comparison highlights the need to address each
of the basin situations along the border individually. An incremental
approach that recognizes the uniqueness of these individual cases will not
only help build a body of binational managerial experience, but will also
strengthen the social bases for cooperative efforts in this area. Moreover,
this comparison emphasizes the need to build a greater basis of mutuality
as well as the need to perfect and build national commitments to principled
bases for joint management. Consequently, it is important to look carefully
at the current institutional base for binational cooperation, recent
institutional trends, and new developments in international prescriptive
law that may contribute to progress on these issues.
III. INSTITUTIONAL TRENDS AFFECTING THE PROSPECTS FOR
COOPERATIVE TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT ON THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER
Over the past 25 years, a number of important institutional
developments have brought Mexico and the United States closer to
resolving the transboundary water dispute. These developments have
contributed to the basis of mutuality necessary for co-management and
aided in addressing the constitutional order of decision making affecting
extant management practices in transboundary groundwater basins. Such
trends include a broadening of the binational regime for dealing with
environment and water problems along the border and recent
developments in international law concerning shared management of
transboundary groundwater basins. As these trends may be useful in
settling actual and potential conflicts, a brief discussion is warranted.
What, in Ostrom's terms, may be called the institutional status quo
for dealing with transboundary groundwater problems is both a function
of domestic water law and international agreements. As stated earlier,
national legal regimes governing the appropriation and use of
groundwater vary greatly along the border, ranging from Mexico's
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centralized system of national controls to the decentralized system of state
water law found in the United States. Under Mexican law, groundwater is
principally a national resource. It may be privately owned and utilized
subject to the state's authority to regulate withdrawals, establish protected
zones, and protect the interests of private citizens.32 Mexico's National
Water Commission (CNA), a semi-autonomous federal agency under the
authority of SEMARNAP, manages groundwater in the national interest
and has the authority to declare protected zones and limit the taking of
water in these areas.' Responsibility for implementing the nation's water
quality regulations is shared between CNA and SEMARNAP. ' Despite this
infrastructure, the Mexican government has generallyneglected to manage
groundwater. Along the border, there are few protected zones, a factor that
has contributed to substantial overdrafts and water quality problems.3' A
recent World Bank report found Mexican groundwater management
practices suffered from various deficiencies, including inadequate
monitoring systems, a lack of quantitative studies of aquifers, the absence
of a comprehensive information system to process groundwater data, and
a dearth of essential environmental and socio-economic assessments of
groundwater extraction activities.36
In the United States, groundwater management is largely a
function of state lawP Three of the four border states, Arizona, California,
and Texas, use some variation of common law property rights to establish
ownership and limits on groundwater withdrawals, while New Mexico
uses the legal doctrine of prior appropriation (first in time, first in right)
and grants permits to authorize takings.3 While the border states are
gradually moving towards greater regulation, and may be subject to
federal pressure to do so in the future,3 they have thus far been slow to
32. See LEY DE AGUAS NAcIONALES, supra note 25.
33. See id. See also Reglamento dela LeydeAguasNacionales, DIAROOICIAL (12 de Enero,
1994).
34. SEMARNAP's authority is grounded in the Federal Environmental Law and
references to the Federal Environmental Law within the National Water Law. See-LEy
GENERAL DEL EQuILERIo EcoLoGIco Y LA PROrEccioN AL AMFIENTE, arts. 117-32 (1988,
revisado 13 de Deciembre 1996); LEY DE AGUAS NACIONALES, supra note 25, at art. 86.
35. See THE WORLD BANK, REP. No. 15435-ME, STAPF APPRAISAL REPORT. MExIco
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAm 12, Annex C, tbl.C-3 (1996).
36. See id.
37. Except where inter-state conflicts arise or where federal environmental and public
health laws apply.
38. See Wehmhoefer, supra note 25; Wells A. Hutchins, WaterRights Laws in the Nineteen
Western States, (Dep't Agric., Miscellaneous Pub. No. 1206,1971).
39. Though state law predominates in groundwater regulation in the United States, the
potential for greater federal involvement derives from the more recent managerial
approach to water use and allocation at the federal level and possible applications of the
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limit groundwater withdrawals. Only a few high-risk zones along the
border are presently subject to direct regulation or withdrawal limits.'°
Groundwater thus remains largely available to those property owners,
public and private, with the capacity and will to extract the resource.
On the Mexico-U.S. border, transboundary surface water
management has largely been entrusted to the IBWC, while management
of transboundary groundwaterbasins remains essentially unregulated. The
architects of the IBWC's mandate deliberately avoided making any
reference to transboundary groundwater, regarding this and other matters
as ancillary to the agreement.41 However, the IBWC's mandate was
narrowly extended by Minute 242 to address the San Luis groundwater
dispute in 1973.42 This extension of authority has not gone unquestioned,
as some governmental and institutional stakeholders in the United States
have expressed concern that Minute 242 lacks the authority for such an
application.'
While the institutional authority of the IBWC has not
fundamentally changed in this area, since 1973 the institutional context has
changed quite substantially. In 1983, the adoption of the Border
Environment Cooperation Agreement (La Paz Agreement) created the first
institutional arena and agenda for ongoing bilateral discussions on a range
of environmental questions including water resources." While
groundwater questions were not initially addressed and have never
loomed large in the deliberations under the La Paz Agreement's binational
Water Working Group, some groundwater quality issues have received
attention. From this modest basis, the two governments have broadened
their water resources agenda such that it now extends to the collection and
sharing of basic data on groundwater dynamics along the border, with
specific projects directed at the Trinity Edwards aquifer in the Del
Rio/Eagle Pass region, the Hueco Bolson, the New Mexico-Chihuahua
border area, and the Santa Cruz River basin at Ambos Nogales.' The
governmental participants in these projects include the IBWC, EPA, CNA,
federal Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and the 1986 Federal Power Act
Amendments to groundwater situations. SeeW.WATERPOLICYREVIEWADVISORYCOMM'N,
WATER IN THE WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEW CENTURY 3.38-39 (1998).
40. See Mumme, supra note 6.
41. See Utton, supra note 4, at 488-89.
42. See Minute 242, supra note 1.
43. See Ival V. Goslin, Colorado River Development, in VALUES AND CHOICES IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLORADO RVER BASIN 18, 56-57 (Dean F. Peterson & A. Berry
Crawford eds., 1978).
44. Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment in the Border Area, Aug. 14,1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10,827.
45. See BORDER XXI PROGRAM 1997-1998 IMPLEMENTATION PLANS, supra note 15.
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U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and various state agencies on both sides of
the border.4 '
Trade integration has also contributed to the broadening
institutional context for groundwater management on the border. The
advent of the Mexico-U.S. Border Environment Cooperation Commission
(BECC), in particular, has drawn attention to the issues of water quantity,
water quality, and the need to achieve "sustainable solutions" to these
problems.' Additionally, the BECC has fostered a more intensive and
collaborative approach among border institutions, engaging established
institutions like the IBWC in environmentally centered discussions. This
engagement has pushed the limits of the IBWC's traditional mandate and
constructively drawn it into the broader debates occurring within each
country and across the border.n ' As the only binational organization with
an organic focus on sustainable development, the BECC has brought other
binational institutions into the sustainability debate. Moreover, it has also
provided a forum for the public to express its environmental concerns, a
forum that did not exist prior to 1994.
Another NAFTA inspired institution, the trinational Commission
on Environmental Cooperation (CEC), has also contributed to the new
emphasis on sustainable development in the border region. The CEC
supports the development of multilateral agreements that promote and
protect the environment. Where compelling arguments are made that
national governments are not living up to their legal commitments to
protect the environment, the CEC can investigate and engage in fact
finding, as well as engage in other activities aimed at educating and
supporting the trinational public's capacity to act in support of
environmental protection. 9
While the Mexico-U.S. border region is but one part of the CEC's
large geographic mandate, its trinational focus enables it to draw linkages
and raise issues within a broader regional context. This is helpful in
building and strengthening national commitments to environmental
protection on the constitutional level by establishing norms and regulations
for use of common pool resources.' For example, the CEC is presently
pushing trinational commitment to a protocol requiring international
46. See id.
47. Lenard Milich &RobertG. Varady, Openness, Sustainabilityand Public Participation:
New Designs for Transboundary River Basin Institutions, 8 J. ENV'T & DEV. 258,292-93 (1999).
48. See id. at 292-95. See also Stephen P. Mumme & S. Moore, Innovation Prospects in
U.S.-Mexico Border Water Management: The IBWC and the BECC in Comparative Perspective,
17 GOV'T & POL'Y C: ENV'T & PLAN. 753,768-770 (1999).
49. See PIERRE MARK JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT & NAFTA:
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEw CoNTINENTAL LAw (1996).
50. See id. at 121-30.
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cooperation among the parties in addressing the transboundary
environmental impacts of domestic activities.1 Such a protocol may come
too late to assist in solutions to problems like the dispute over the AAC,'
but it may contribute to greater binational cooperation in dealing with
other groundwater problems along the border.
In yet another example, a CEC advisory panel's recent
investigation and report on the management of the Upper San Pedro River
on the Sonora-Arizona border recommends the two countries move
towards a more comprehensive binational management of the basin's
water resources, and adopt a variant of the El Paso de Norte Air Quality
Management Task Force approach to binational oversight and policy
development. ' The CEC report further suggests that the IBWC and BECC
"in cooperation with federal, state, and local officials and private
citizens.. .play an integral role in developing the proposed body and
making it operational." Short of this, the report outlines a number of
practical measures that may be taken concurrently within each country to
improve joint-at least coordinate-management.' The CEC, together with
the BECC and the Water Working Group may very well facilitate the
development of an IBWC Environmental Minute that would lend support
to efforts to rotect the quality and sustainable use of groundwater along
the border.sf
Coupled with this broadening institutional and public concern is
an evolution in legal thinking. While these developments have not yet led
to the Holy Grail of customary international law, a treaty specifically
directed at resolving international disputes over both fluvial and confined
basin groundwater, they provide a basis of hope that agreements
addressing groundwater will eventually be adopted. Until then, other
relevant treaties inform binational discussions on resolving transboundary
groundwater disputes and, as such, warrant attention.
The first treaty worthy of attention is the Bellagio Draft Treaty on
Transboundary Groundwaters (Draft Treaty).% The Draft Treaty, which
51. See COMM'N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION, ANNUAL REPORT (1997).
52. For discussion of the very limited international aspect of environmental impact
assessment in the AAC case, see Jones et al., supra note 22.
53. See COMM'N ON ENVTL COOPERATION, ADVISORY PANEL REPORTON THE UPPER SAN
PEDRO RIVER INMA77VE (1998).
54. See id.
55. In the past year scholars have called for a reinterpretation of the 1944 Water
Treaty's Article 3 defining the priority of uses of treaty waters to incorporate environmental
values. See William Snape, Adding an Environmental Minute to the 1944 Water Treaty:
Impossible or Inevitable, Workshop Proceedings: Water and Environmental Issues of the
Colorado River Border Region Roundtable Workshop vi-viii (1999). See also comments by
law professor David Getches in the same workshop.
56. See HAYroN & UTrON, supra note S.
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builds on the evolving work by the professional International Law
Association (ILA) and the United Nations' prestigious International Law
Commission (ILC), was catalyzed in part by the ILC's controversial
conclusion that groundwater must be redefined as "one of the
'hydrographic components' of any watercourse system."" This important
conceptual breakthrough insured that groundwater, at least in part, would
be addressed by the UN's Treaty on the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses.'
The principles of the Draft Treaty may be distilled into five
essential tenets. First, it draws a connection between the customary
international law on surface waters and that on groundwaters. Second, it
links the supply and quality of groundwater, and balances the emphasis on
allocation with an emphasis on water quality management and public
health. Third, it emphasizes that the twin goals of (1) "optimum utilization
and conservation" and (2) "the need to protect the underground
environment" must be balanced on "an equitable and reasonable basis."
Fourth, it emphasizes the need for the parties "to develop and maintain
reliable data and information concerning transboundary aquifers and their
waters." Finally, the Draft Treaty emphasizes the value of establishing
transboundary groundwater conservation areas and conservation
management plans.
While these five tenets do not fully represent the substance of the
Bellagio Draft Treaty, they are important in several respects. Most
significantly, they are carefully drafted so as to stimulate consensus
building in international law. As they gain greater acceptance, they gain
greater legal force and, in turn, become a useful guide or model for
international agreements on joint management of transboundary
groundwater basins. These five principles also build on the wisdom of
experience with water management on the Mexico-U.S. border and the
global study of water dispute resolution. For example, in recognition that
there is a greater likelihood of reaching agreement where common interests
may be identified, the Draft Treaty balances public health concerns with
water allocation and utilization concerns. Moreover, these principles
embrace the need to be flexible and fair in advancing solutions to
transboundary groundwater disputes, stressing the importance of
weighing and adjusting competing values in water management and the
need to approach these questions on an equitable and reasonable basis.
57. Id. at 669.
58. See G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997), reprinted in 36
I.L.M. 700-20 [hereinafter United Nations Convention].
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Finally, they point to certain practical instruments that may be deployed to
implement these guidelines.
While some of these principles remain controversial within the
international legal community, particularly the question of whether the
principle of "equitable utilization" should prevail over a party's obligation
to cause "no significant harm," the Draft Treaty provides a credible and
adaptable template for sustainable management of transboundary
groundwater that links commonly accepted principles of customary
international law to the varied hydrographic, socio-economic, and political
circumstances found in relation to these aquifers. The Draft Treaty also
may be drawn upon by scholars and policy makers interested in thinking
through the range of issues and approaches that might be adopted by
governments seeking solutions to transboundary groundwater problems.
Indeed, it may have indirectly contributed to ILC work in the 1990s aimed
at developing an international treaty on the non-navigational uses of
international watercourses."
In 1994, the ILC produced Draft Articles on the topic that were
used by the UN in negotiating the Convention on the Law of Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses, adopted by the UN
General Assembly May 21,1997.6 As the first set of guiding principles on
the non-navigational uses of international watercourses to be adopted by
the global body, these rules are significant precursors to an international
water courses regime. Surely, this will carry weight in the voluntary design
of international solutions to transboundary groundwater disputes as well
as proffer solutions-arbitration and adjudication-to these problems.
While this Convention, following the ILC Draft Articles, addresses only
those watercourse that are hydrologically connected to surface streams, its
recommendations will likely influence iuture agreement on transboundary
groundwaters.
The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses moves the international community closer to
a set of principles that will contribute to the settlement of these increasingly
critical disputes. It incorporates both the principles of "equitable
utilization" and "no significant harm" while giving slightly greater
preference to the latter in settling international watercourse disputes.'1
These principles guide international negotiations and provide a substantial
59. Seegenerally Stephen S. McCaffreyAnAssessment of the Work of the International Law
Commission, 36 NAT. RSOURCES J. 297 (1996).
60. See id. See also United Nations Convention, supra note 58.
61. See United Nations Convention, supra note 58, at arts. 5-7. For a discussion of the
principle of "no significant harm," see Albert E. Utton, Which Rule Should Prevail in
International Water Disputes: That of Reasonableness or that of No Harm?, 36 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 635 (1996).
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basis for addressing international water quality issues in transboundary
groundwater basins and allocation and utilization of groundwater. This
Convention also contains a process for addressing proposed changes to a
water course system by one or more of the watercourse states.' The
recommended procedural rule requires states to provide prior notice of any
intended alteration of a watercourse and allows the affected state(s) up to
six months to respond before a project may be undertaken. If one or more
of the affected states objects to the project, implementation must be
suspended for another six months while consultations on a solution
proceed. In its other provisions, the Convention provides explicit support
for the preservation of ecosystems,' identifies a range of "harmful
conditions" which states must prevent or mitigate if harmful to other
states," and provides private citizens extraterritorial access to the judicial
systems of other countries to seek relief for damages incurred by a state's
water-course related actions.'
It is important to note, however, that this Convention does not
explicitly address or directly apply to confined transboundary
groundwater. In this regard the Convention reflects the unresolvable
differences regarding the proper status of confined transboundary
groundwater. In fact, the ILC addressed this question in a separate vague
resolution that "[c]ommends States to be guided by the principles
contained in the Draft Articles" for the purpose of resolving disputes
related to confined transboundary groundwater."
Despite this limitation, these recent developments in customary
international law strengthen the capacity of nations to seek solutions to
groundwater disputes by utilizing pre-existing diplomatic architecture for
international dispute resolution at the regional and global level. In this
regard they complement the developments on the institutional level that
affect water management on the Mexico-U.S. border. Though not sufficient
in and of themselves, these agreements help to draw Mexico and the
United States to the negotiating table. In the 25 years since Minute 242 was
adopted, the necessary institutional mechanisms have gradually
developed, bringing these two nations closer to addressing and resolving
the transboundary groundwater dispute.
62. See United Nations Convention, supra note 58, at arts. 13-15.
63, See id. at art. 20.
64. Id. at art. 27.
65. See id. at art. 32.
66. See McCaffrey, supra note 59, at 317.
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IV. MOVING BEYOND MINUTE 242 IN MANAGING BORDER
GROUNDWATER
What lessons can be drawn from this review of the Mexico-U.S.
transboundary groundwater situation that may contribute to the realization
of Minute 242's mandates? In my view, a number of suggestions arise.
First, although progress has been made, we still need to strengthen our
technical knowledge of groundwater along the border. Additionally, great
cross-border dissemination of this knowledge needs to occur. This means
supporting the efforts of the IBWC, BECC, EPA, SEMARNAP, Water
Working Group, and other agencies to build up the stock of information on
groundwater aquifers straddling the border.
Additionally, at the diplomatic level we must strive for
incremental, case-by-case solutions to Mexico-U.S. transboundary
groundwater problems, building up a common base of principles,
experiences, and practices that will provide solutions for those remaining
problems. Our aim should be the strengthening of the basis for
"mutuality." According to Ostrom, this is the key to further cooperative
efforts in dealing with these problems.
Moreover, as a point of departure, we should center our attention
on the tractability of these problems, particularly the social construction of
these problems, as they are distributed through the border zone. We must
better understand how these problems vary in terms of their potential for
engaging the affected communities in cooperative efforts aimed at the
sustainable management of these resources. We must identify cases where
institutional density is greatest, where the problem of resource
management is less divisible, and where there is greater prospect of
building consensus on shared values. The preceding review, for instance,
suggests that tackling problems where water quality is a prominent local
concern may lead more directly to binational cooperation than those cases
where the issue has surfaced as a distributive or allocation concern. Along
these same lines, we should explore a variety of incentives-drawing on
various market-based options as well as regulatory devices-to strengthen
all of the stakeholders' interests in cooperative solutions to these problems.
Fourth, we should support those efforts at the binational,
trinational, regional, and global levels that deepen the commitments of
both nations to binational cooperation. This includes strengthening our
understanding of transboundary groundwater problems and our capacity
to solve them, not just at the geophysical or hydrological level, but at the
environmental, public health, socio-economic, and institutional levels as
well. In this regard, we should support the work of the IBWC and the
Water Working Group in developing binational databases on the
hydrology of transboundary aquifers. Additionally, the CEC's
transboundary environmental impact study initiative contributes to this
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process of building institutional commitments to a cooperative process, as
does the work of the ILC and the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Further, joint efforts in air
shed management in EPJAZ have experiential benefits for local
communities striving to cooperatively solve a range of important shared
resources problems.
Finally, following the lead of visionaries in the international
environmental legal community, we should support those prescriptive
solutions that balance values and emphasize equity as well as place
protection of environmental values on the docket along with human health
and material well being. In this regard it is reasonable to suggest that
statesmen on both sides of the border take another look at the Bellagio
Draft Treaty for guidance on balancing competing values in transboundary
groundwater management as weil as institutional design. In the persistent
tradition established by Al Utton, we should continue to identify potential
solutions, advance designs, offer suggestions, and persuade appropriate
agencies on state, federal, and binational levels to address these issues.
In sum, there is much that we can and should do to build on the
developments that have occurred over the past 25 years, for they hold
promise for advancing cooperative solutions to our common groundwater
problems. As we all recognize, the solutions to this particular class of
transboundary resource problems are the critical components in the
sustainable future for all of the border communities.
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TABLE 2. TYPES OF MEXICO-U.S. GROUNDWATER PROBLEMS GROUPED
BY DOMINANT ISSUE TYPE AND DEMOGRAPHIC SETTING*
DEMOGRAPHY DOMINANT ISSUE TYPE
Allocation Water Quality Both
Predominant Urban El Paso-Cd. Juirez Ambos
Douglas-Agua Prieta Nogales
Ambos Naco
Hueco Bolson
Predominant Rural Yuma Mesa-SLRC New River Imperial-
S.Luis/Playas/Hachita Mexicali
Minor Bolsons
Mixed/hard to Sonoyta-Organ Pipe Tijuana Basin Mesilla Bolson
classify San Pedro River Carrizo-Wilcox
Mimbres Aquifer Gulf Coast
Edwards-Trinity
* See generally Stephen P. Mumme, Groundwater Management on the Mexico-United
States Border (Dec. 1996) (unpublished report submitted to the Commission on
Environmental Cooperation, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, as part of the Mexico-United
States-Canada Transboundary Inland Water Project, on file with author).
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